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INTRODUCTION BY ALESSANDRA BANIEL-STARK
Our moderator for the last panel of the day is Professor Jed
Shugerman. Professor Shugerman is a legal historian, who is widely
published in law journals in addition to publishing a book about the
history of judicial elections.1 He teaches at Fordham University
School of Law, and he has graciously agreed to guide us through our
last panel.
REMARKS OF JED SHUGERMAN
I am happy to state that this is the best panel of the day. I also
might be a little bit biased, and this is a panel on the new frontiers of
bias, so it’s only appropriate to disclose my own bias in this case. I
want to start with a note, before I introduce the panel, about one way
to think about this topic in a broader sense. I wrote a book on the
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
** John J. Schumacher Chair in Law, Southwestern Law School.
*** Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
**** Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law.
***** Professor of Law, Daniel J. Dykstra Endowed Chair, U.C. Davis School of
Law.
1. JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL IN-
DEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012).
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history of judicial elections to explain how America chose this very
peculiar institution.2 And the way to frame it is that judicial indepen-
dence as a concept is actually historically contingent, and it changes—
it’s a very relative concept. The reason why judicial elections were
adopted in the first place was because of a commitment to judicial
independence; they were framed as a way not to make judges less
independent, they were framed explicitly to make judges more
independent.3 How do we make sense of that?
Justice O’Connor mentioned earlier today that Ohio adopted judi-
cial elections in 1850.4 Ohio was part of a wave of states that decided
to change over to judicial elections.5 And the reason why they made
that change was because it was the middle of an economic crisis in
which half of the banks in the country folded and eight states went
into bankruptcy. The blame was focused on the governors and the leg-
islators who had misspent and mismanaged the states’ funds.6 But sec-
ondarily the judges were blamed for not being a check on the other
branches.7 So the argument was, in order to make judges more
independent—from whom?—from governors and legislators and a
corrupt appointment process, elections were necessary. It was framed
explicitly that way. I just want to note here that judicial independence
is a relative concept.
Today we have been focused on the question of how to make
judges independent (from whom? from special interests, that’s what
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., id. at 57–83 (discussing the rationale that drove the shift toward judi-
cial elections).
4. OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. IV, § 6.
5. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 1, at 105 (“From 1846 to 1851, twelve states
adopted partially elective systems. By 1860, out of thirty-one states in the Union,
eighteen states elected all of their judges, and five more elected some of their
judges.”). See generally Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Dem-
ocratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges,
1850–1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345 (discussing the change in Ohio in con-
text of developments in other states related to judicial elections).
6. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 1, at 85 (“The reputations of the legislatures R
around the country took an enormous and long-lasting hit after they had banked so
heavily on new banks and expensive internal improvements.”); Jed Handlesman
Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1079 (2010) [hereinafter Shugerman, Economic Crisis]
(“However, by the 1840s, ‘the people began to see the legislature as the source of
many, if not most, of the problems of government.’” (quoting STEVEN H. STEINGLASS
& GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION 25 (2004))).
7. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 1, at 95 (“Delegates from both parties [to the 1846 R
New York Convention] argued that judicial elections would also strengthen the sepa-
ration of powers and encourage the courts to check the legislature and strike down
more statutes.”). See generally Shugerman, Economic Crisis, supra note 6. R
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recusal addresses) when special interests spend money. But I think this
panel is going to look more broadly when we ask about “judicial inde-
pendence from whom,” or about what kinds of bias will lead judges to
be less independent. Some of these are internal, mental processes. One
way to think about it is that judicial appointments themselves have
their own biases and their own corruption, and so judicial selection is
often a sense of relative judicial independence. From whom are we
making judges independent?
One other way to think about it is: when do we have not relative
but general or absolute judicial independence? There are a couple
points that came up earlier today. Judge Clarke, for example, illus-
trated this, and this was also part of the debate in the Judicial Lunch
among the judges,8 that longer terms—not the selection of judges, but
how long they serve—make judges more independent.9 Even if more
money is spent on the front end, they are then more independent from
feeling like they have to serve those interests if they serve a life term.
So ironically, West Virginia, with the Caperton case, had huge
amounts of money but very long terms. Judge Benjamin actually
served a twelve-year term,10 and had less to worry about for the next
election compared to, let’s say, judges in New Jersey, which has ap-
pointed judges, not elections, but those judges are appointed initially
to seven-year terms11 so they face politics and the special interests of
reappointment much more directly than Judge Benjamin having to
think about special interest spending thereafter.
So that’s one aspect. General independence helps us think about a
couple things. One is, when we think about judicial independence
from special interests and public opinion, we can think about ways to
address them more broadly. I think that’s a different kind of question
beyond recusal for special interests. And another point is to simply say
that there are other selection methods. To throw out one proposal: it
turns out that merit selection, when you study it closely, winds up not
having the same amount of spending over the last twenty to thirty
years.12 Now, it’s trending a little bit in the direction of more spend-
8. See supra pp. 577–79.
9. See also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elec-
tions, Role Fidelity, and American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349 (2010) [hereinafter
Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms] (arguing that judicial elections with long terms
have shaped more responsive benches).
10. W.V. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
11. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 3.
12. SHUGERMAN, supra note 1, at 253 (citing state-specific judicial campaign fi- R
nance reports collected in 2009 from the American Judicature Society and the Na-
tional Institute of Money in State Politics).
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ing, but it is so far behind the unopposed yes-or-no retention elections
that there isn’t even close to the same amount of spending, even today,
in these retention elections.13 But does merit selection really produce
the best judges in terms of merit? You don’t have to rely on that.
That’s not the explanation for this. There are two explanations for the
lack of spending: if you don’t know who you are going to be electing
to replace that judge when you vote “no,” you are less likely to invest
in that judge. It might be someone very similar, so special interests
have less incentive to get a “no” vote if they don’t know who the new
judge is going to be. Now, it’s true that Don Blankenship in the
Caperton case was maybe more focused on defeating Justice Mc-
Graw, but he at least knew that he had a supporter coming in. So that’s
one example I like to give as to why merit selection may be a solution
to special-interest funding that is a little bit broader than the recusal
suggestion.
There’s another angle, too, in terms of being captured by special
interests. Merit selection, whether or not it produces more meritorious
judges, still has a more pluralist way of choosing judges. The commis-
sions that nominate, that send a list to the governor—what happens is
the governor gets a list of three names [for instance] from a commis-
sion; that commission is drawn from various members of the public. It
has sitting judges, it has the state bar, it has representatives from the
government, and it has representatives from the legislature.14 Each of
those groups can be a veto on the crony—such as Harriet Miers or
Abe Fortas, to pick bipartisan examples15—who is really in the pocket
of the governor or the executive branch. In the same way, the state bar
can be a check on the other groups and the other groups can be a
check on the state bar. So the person who winds up getting nominated
or being sent to the governor doesn’t have any one actor to thank for
the job. To finish the big-picture point, there are other mechanisms
beyond recusal to think about for promoting judicial independence—
judicial independence from special interests, judicial independence
from the other branches, and judicial independence from public opin-
13. Id. at 254–55 (discussing increased spending in merit-based judicial elections).
14. Id. at 258 (describing the historical makeup of judicial nomination commis-
sions). See generally MALIA REDDICK & REBECCA LOVE KOURLIS, INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CHOOSING JUDGES: JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 7–8 (2014), http://
iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/choosing_judges_jnc_report.
pdf (providing an overview of states’ nominating commissions’ compositions).
15. See A. E. Dick Howard, The Changing Face of the Supreme Court, 101 VA. L.
REV. 231, 287, 306 (2015) (describing the objections raised against Supreme Court
nominees Fortas and Miers).
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ion; and that, I suggest, is merit selection with yes-or-no retention
elections and, most importantly, longer terms.
Now we’ll get other perspectives from Caperton’s next genera-
tion—beyond the bank or breaking the bank, breaking beyond the idea
of the money here—to draw attention to other kinds of judicial bias
and partiality, to look at bias, and to discuss recusal for reasons that go
beyond campaign contributions, and maybe other perspectives on how
to make courts more fair and more reliable.
So first we have Debra Lyn Bassett, the Justice Marshall F. Mc-
Comb Professor of Law at Southwestern Law School. She focuses her
scholarship on federal litigation and legal ethics, and her writing regu-
larly employs insight from law and psychology. On her website she
talks about how much she loves doing research that combines theory
and practice, and I think this panel is a good example of making that
synthesis between theory and practice.
Then we’ll have her frequent co-author Rex Perschbacher, who is
the Daniel J. Dykstra Chair at U.C. Davis. He was dean of that school
for ten years. He teaches in the areas of civil procedure, professional
responsibility, and clinical teaching.
Then we’ll have Gregory Parks, who has a J.D. and Ph.D. in psy-
chology. He teaches at Wake Forest University School of Law. He
didn’t put this in the official biography, maybe he didn’t want to show
all of his accomplishments, but he’s about my age and he’s already
edited or authored ten books, so that’s amazing. Professor Parks is
currently working on a book about unconscious race bias and law.
And finally Dmitry Bam will speak. He is an associate professor
at the University of Maine Law School, and he has also published
prolifically. He is a scholar and commentator on judicial ethics, judi-
cial selection, and constitutional interpretation, and he has written a lot
about Caperton and these issues. So I am very happy to serve as a
moderator on this panel because I think they have a lot more to say
than I do right now. So without further ado, Debra.
REMARKS OF DEBRA LYN BASSETT
Good afternoon, everyone. Many thanks to the Journal of Legis-
lation and Public Policy for organizing this symposium and to NYU,
the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, and the Brennan
Center for Justice for sponsoring this symposium.
One of the recurring problems in judicial recusal and disqualifi-
cation is that a judge’s belief in his or her own impartiality misses the
point. Public confidence in the judiciary doesn’t result from the judici-
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ary’s perspective of impartiality—it results from the parties’ and the
public’s perception of impartiality. Perhaps unfortunately, it is a very
human tendency to have what’s called egocentric bias: the ability to
see bias in other people, but not so much in ourselves.16 This is one of
the problems with having motions for judicial disqualification heard
by the very judge whose impartiality is being challenged. And, in ad-
dition to egocentric bias, judges’ perceptions of their own impartiality
also suffer from unconscious—truly unconscious—motivations.
Until the 1980s, most psychologists believed that attitudes, in-
cluding prejudices, operated consciously—that individuals were con-
sciously aware of their own biases and stereotypes.17 Therefore,
psychologists relied on self-reporting to measure bias and prejudice.18
However, it turns out that we are not consciously aware of all of our
biases and prejudices. The human brain is continually bombarded with
stimuli, and in order for the brain to function efficiently, it employs
largely unconscious methods of organizing information, and it creates
shortcuts for the processing of information.19 And that’s generally a
good thing, or the brain would be completely overwhelmed.
One of the brain’s shortcuts involves distinguishing various ob-
jects based on features of the objects that then coalesce into patterns.20
That way, rather than having to stop and figure out each time what a
16. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
777, 811–13 (2001) (“People tend to make judgments about themselves and their
abilities that are ‘egocentric’ or ‘self-serving.’ People routinely estimate, for example,
that they are above average on a variety of desirable characteristics, including health,
driving, professional skills, and likelihood of having a successful marriage. . . . Ego-
centric biases could lead judges to believe that they are better decision makers than is
really the case.”); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1225–26 (2009) (suggesting that
“judges might be overconfident about their abilities to control their own biases” in
light of a survey conducted of judges attending a conference who were asked to rate
their ability to “avoid racial prejudice in decisionmaking” compared to other judges at
the same conference and in which ninety-seven percent of the judges placed them-
selves in the top half).
17. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition:
Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 4 (1995).
18. Id.
19. These organizational frameworks and mental shortcuts include schemas and
heuristics. See DAVID G. MYERS, PSYCHOLOGY 143 (7th ed. 2004) (describing
schemas); RICHARD C. WAITES, COURTROOM PSYCHOLOGY AND TRIAL ADVOCACY 52
(2003) (describing heuristics as “a mental shortcut”); Richard E. Nisbett et al., The
Use of Statistical Heuristics in Everyday Inductive Reasoning (describing heuristics as
“rapid and more or less automatic judgmental rules of thumb”), in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 510 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds.,
2002).
20. Pamela M. Casey et al., Addressing Implicit Bias in the Courts, 49 CT. REV. 64,
64 (2012), http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/publications/courtrv/cr49-1/CR49-1Casey.pdf.
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desk, a lamp, or a refrigerator is every time we see one, we come to
recognize the general characteristics of those objects, such that we
know what they are—even when the style or the materials vary.
The thing is that we have these organizational shortcuts not just
for objects, but also for human beings.21 Over time, the brain learns to
sort people into certain groups based on combinations of characteris-
tics such as age, and gender, and race, and role. The brain’s sorting
process includes the use of stereotypes, meaning traits that we associ-
ate with a category and which develop from our experiences with
others.22 Some of these experiences are direct, but most of them are
vicarious, such as from books, movies, media, and culture.23
Although the brain’s automatic sorting processes are necessary,
they can also lead to discrimination. The problem occurs when the
brain automatically associates certain characteristics with specific
groups, and it turns out that those characteristics are not accurate for
all of the individuals within that group—for example, “Elderly indi-
viduals are frail.” These implicit attitudes—attitudes of which we are
not consciously aware, and which operate automatically—include
both stereotypes and an affective component, meaning an association
between a group and an attitude.24 That attitude can be positive, or it
can be negative.
Through a test called the Implicit Association Test, psychologists
have found that most people harbor unconscious biases in a variety of
areas, including race, gender, age, and disability25—even people who
believe themselves to be unbiased may nevertheless have unconscious
biases and prejudices. The significance of this psychological research
is what prompted the recent development of programs by the ABA
Section on Litigation and the National Center for State Courts for
21. Id.
22. JERRY KANG, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO ENSURE THE RACIAL & ETHNIC FAIRNESS OF
AM.’S STATE COURTS, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 1 (2009), http://
www.courts.ca.gov/documents/BTB_XXII_WEDF_3.pdf.
23. Id.; see also, e.g., Sherryl Browne Graves, Television and Prejudice Reduction:
When Does Television as a Vicarious Experience Make a Difference?, 55 J. SOC.
ISSUES 707, 707, 714–17 (1999) (exploring the effects of diverse television characters
on children’s racial attitudes in light of television’s role as “a key socializing agent” in
the lives of children).
24. See generally Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences
in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998) (describing how the Implicit Association Test measures differ-
ential associations between concepts and attributes); Greenwald & Banaji, supra note
17. R
25. See Brian Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 36–37 (2007).
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judges to educate them about this phenomenon of unconscious bias.26
Unfortunately, however, the psychological literature has also consist-
ently shown that at this point in time, in our current understanding of
psychological principles, the ability to override unconscious bias is
only temporary: at some point after the conclusion of the program or
the workshop, the brain’s automatic, unconscious processes will kick
back in.27 So self-awareness is a crucial, very important first step, but
just one workshop isn’t going to eliminate unconscious biases. And
this supports the need—the absolute need—for additional or alterna-
tive decision-makers when reviewing motions for judicial disqualifica-
tion, rather than leaving the decision only to the challenged judge.
Thank you.
REMARKS OF REX R. PERSCHBACHER
Thank you, thank you Jed, thank you to the Journal of Legisla-
tion and Public Policy, thank you to the Brennan Center, and thank
you to the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility—I hope I got
everyone more or less right. I wanted to talk about bias in a breezy,
international style if I could today.
If we take a look at judicial recusal and disqualification issues
internationally, we find the exact same issues as we have here in the
United States, as illustrated in the Caperton case. For example—and I
have three-plus examples—bias issues are reviewed generally from
the perspective of the judge, not an outsider, even when using as a
guide the appearance of impartiality, which is one of the ABA’s stan-
26. See Mark A. Drummond, Section of Litigation Tackles Implicit Bias, 36 LITIG.
NEWS 20, 20–21 (2011) (reporting on the ABA’s creation of a program addressing
implicit bias in the judiciary); see also PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCA-
TION 6 (2012), http://www.ncsc.org/IBReport.
27. See Justin D. Levinson, Corporations Law: Biased Corporate Decision-Mak-
ing? [hereinafter Levinson, Biased Corporate Decision-Making?] (noting that the
“temporary nature of de-biasing underscores the continuing need to focus on longer
term remedies to implicit bias”), in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 146, 162
n.46 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten
Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J.
345, 411 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality] (“A significant
amount of research has focused on whether implicit biases can be temporarily elimi-
nated or modified. These efforts have achieved mixed levels of success, and indicate
that exposure to diversity or viewing minority exemplars, for example, can sometimes
temporarily reduce people’s implicit biases.”); see also Levinson, Forgotten Racial
Equality, supra at 417 (“Implicit racial biases are elicited quickly and easily, and can
only be temporarily reduced through interventional approaches.”).
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dards.28 Second, the first level of review of judicial disqualifications
nearly always resides, internationally, with the very judge whose bias
is being challenged, with the unfortunate consequence that the chal-
lenged litigant is asking the accused to acknowledge his or her own
bias. The next level of review goes to a court of which, at best, the
challenged judge is either a member or with which he or she is famil-
iar as an additional party, which is therefore a problem. And I apolo-
gize to the judges here—I realize I’m going to insult everyone at some
point here, so I am apologizing in advance in the hopes but not the
expectation that you’ll forgive me. Third, no courts appear to take
seriously the need to avoid the appearance of bias; instead, in the
United States and throughout the world, courts require using the per-
spective of a reasonable observer,29 or even the perspective of some-
one in the judge’s shoes who is evaluating the claim using criteria of
what a fully informed, reasonable judge would understand.30
So throughout the world the standards appear to be remarkably
similar, requiring an unbiased judge—often with “in which it may ap-
pear to a reasonable observer that the judge is unable to decide the
matter impartially” as the only standard for showing bias.31 So, for
example, the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights several generations ago said that “everyone shall be enti-
tled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal.”32 And the United Nations Judicial Integrity group
in 2002 adopted what are called the Bangalore Principles of Judicial
Conduct.33 They provide that “[i]mpartiality is essential to the proper
28. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990) (AM. BAR ASS’N,
amended 2011) (emphasizing that judges should conduct themselves in ways that will
“promote[ ] public confidence in the . . . impartiality of the judiciary”).
29. See, e.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFI-
CATION: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 17–22 (2d ed. 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/judicialdq.pdf/$file/judicialdq.pdf (providing an overview of the
framework under which disqualification claims are analyzed, including the “reasona-
ble observer” standard).
30. See, e.g., Boros v. Baxley, 621 So. 2d 240, 243 (Ala. 1993) (applying a stan-
dard that looked to a hypothetical “reasonable person in the judge’s shoes” (citing
Henderson v. G&G Corp., 582 So. 2d 529, 530 (Ala. 1991))).
31. JUDICIAL GRP. ON STRENGTHENING JUDICIAL INTEGRITY, THE BANGALORE PRIN-
CIPLES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2002) [hereinafter BANGALORE PRINCIPLES], reprinted
in Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy (Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges
and Lawyers), Civil and Political Rights, Including Questions of Independence of the
Judiciary, Administration of Justice, Impunity, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/65, annex
(Jan. 10, 2003), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/101/53/PDF/
G0310153.pdf?OpenElement.
32. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, para. 1, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
33. BANGALORE PRINCIPLES, supra note 31, at para. 2.5. R
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discharge of the judicial office”34 and that “a judge shall perform his
or her judicial duties without favour, bias, or prejudice,”35 and ensure
that [a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself from participating in
any proceeding in which the judge is unable to decide the matter im-
partially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that the
judge is unable”36 to proceed in an unbiased fashion.
Taking a quick look at some common-law jurisdictions where it’s
relatively easier to do the research: in England, Canada, Australia, and
South Africa, the experiences are roughly the same. In Canada, “the
apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and
right-minded persons,”37 who are informed members of the commu-
nity, and who approach the question with a complex and contextual-
ized understanding of the issues in the case38—in other words, like the
judge. The United Kingdom similarly adopted a “real possibility” of
judicial bias as opposed to the “reasonable suspicion” standard, and
the House of Lords ultimately required that the person adopt a bal-
anced approach to bias.39 Australia requires greater emphasis on the
perception of a hypothetical, reasonable person in the apprehension of
bias as perceived by the parties.40 In South Africa, which provides
some distinction, there is a reasonable suspicion standard adopted—
that is, the perspective of the reasonable, suspicious observer—but
presumes that judges will approach the controversies impartially, and
the inquiry is whether a reasonable, objective, and informed person
with the correct facts would reasonably apprehend that the judge
would not be impartial.41
What these standards tend to do is read out the ABA Model
Rules’ standard requiring recusal when necessary to avoid an appear-
ance of impropriety or when a jurist’s impartiality might reasonably
be questioned. We have to ask ourselves, if we are going to protect
against what Chief Judge Lippman was telling us about just recently,42
we need to worry about how the outsiders, the litigants in most cases,
will apprehend the potential for bias—not the judges. So, supposedly
34. Id. at para. 2.
35. Id. at para. 2.1.
36. Id. at para. 2.5.
37. Comm. for Justice & Liberty v. Nat’l Energy Bd., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, 394
(Can.), http://canlii.ca/t/1mk9k.
38. R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 486–87 (Can.), http://canlii.ca/t/1fr05.
39. Lawal v. N. Spirit Ltd. [2003] UKHL 35, [2004] 1 All ER 187, 193 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
40. Webb v The Queen [1994] 181 CLR 41 ¶ 2 (Austl.).
41. President of the Republic of S. Afr. v. S. Afr. Rugby Football Union 1999 (7)
BCLR 725 (CC) at para. 32 (S. Afr.).
42. See supra pp. 552–56.
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these standards are adopted to protect against excessive disqualifica-
tions by devaluing the fear of bias by a litigant. Any evidence of a
crisis anywhere in the world that I know of is absent so far, but if you
know of one you can raise it with me. Possibly there is somehow a
crisis of disqualification occurring somewhere in our world.
REMARKS OF GREGORY S. PARKS
Good afternoon. You all alright? Alright. I want to make sure
everybody’s awake. Thank you to the Brennan Center, and to the NYU
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, especially to Sacha, Eddie,
and Matthew, for your hard work in putting together this symposium
on Caperton and judicial recusal. It is indeed an honor and a privilege
to be here with such distinguished jurists, academics, practitioners,
journalists, and most of all—most importantly—law students. In some
ways I will piggyback on what my co-panelists had to say.
The 1980s synth-pop new wave group The Human League—and
as recently as a few years ago, the biggest boss thus far, rapper Rick
Ross—told us in song, “I’m only human.”43 Such a concept is not
striking. Most certainly these individuals are. But when it comes to
talking and thinking about others in our society, judges in particular,
some may suspect (including some judges themselves) that they are
not mere humans—at least not in their professional capacity. In his
book The Common Law, published in 1881, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. noted, “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been
experience.”44 Some decades later in his work, Law and the Modern
Mind, in 1930, legal realist Jerome Frank carried this concept a bit
further when he observed that some judicial decisions might reflect
such mundane influences as what a judge had to eat for breakfast.45
This notion seems laughable. But over the past several decades, re-
search in the areas of social and cognitive psychology suggests that
Professor Frank may have been onto something. People are complex.
One’s stated attitudes and beliefs often fail to align with one’s actual
thoughts and feelings. In experimental settings, for example, social
desirability—the tendency of research study participants to reply in a
manner that they believe will be viewed favorably by the experi-
menter—may serve as a motivational factor behind a participant’s
43. THE HUMAN LEAGUE, Human, on CRASH (Virgin Records 1986); RICK ROSS,
I’m Only Human, on TRILLA (Def Jam Records 2008).
44. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
45. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L.
REV. 431, 432 (2005) (describing the perhaps apocryphal quote generally attributed to
Frank (citing JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930))).
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lack of candor in a study.46 In social settings, impression manage-
ment—particularly saving face—may be a driving force for individu-
als. Indeed, people do lie.
However, the assumption that human thoughts are entirely acces-
sible to conscious awareness, and that human behavior is largely gov-
erned by conscious agency, has been severely undermined in recent
years.47 People’s expressed reports of their cognitive processes are
often inconsistent with their actual judgments.48 Hence shared cultural
logics and psychological influences on judgment seem to operate
wholly outside of people’s heads and conscious awareness, so much
so that social psychologists now contend that people rely on two dis-
tinct systems of judgment.49 One system is rapid, intuitive, subcon-
scious, and error-prone.50 Another is slow, deductive, and deliberative,
but much more accurate.51 The two systems may operate simultane-
ously, but produce contradictory responses.52 Moreover, the intuitive
system can often dictate choice, while the deductive system may fall
behind to search for rationales that align with accessible memories and
understandings that the individual has about himself.53 As a result,
individuals may be unaware of: (1) the existence of a significant stim-
ulus that could influence a response, (2) the existence of the actual
response, or (3) that the stimulus affected the response.54
Putting this dual system to a test, social psychologists Timothy
Wilson and Richard Nisbett conducted a study in which they required
46. Douglas P. Crowne & David Marlowe, A New Scale of Social Desirability
Independent of Psychopathology, 24 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 349 (1960); Maryon F.
King & Gordon C. Bruner, Social Desirability Bias: A Neglected Aspect of Validity
Testing, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 79 (2000).
47. See, e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 17, at 4. R
48. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 947, 951 (2006).
49. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 17, at 5; Anthony G. Greenwald et al., A R
Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, and Self-Concept, 109
PSYCHOL. REV. 3, 4 (2002).
50. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attri-
bute Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 19, at 49. R
51. See id.
52. See Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 19, at 380. R
53. See Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More than We Can
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 231 (1977) (not-
ing that people’s “reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments
about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given
response”).
54. Id.
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participants to rate four identical pairs of stockings.55 Forty percent
selected the stocking in the right-most display position, while thirty-
one percent selected the stocking just to the left of the most-selected
stocking.56 In essence, there was a position effect. Out of the fifty-two
participants, eighty spontaneous responses were given for why they
made their selection; none mentioned the position of the stocking as
the reason for that selection.57 When the subjects were directly asked
whether the order of the stockings might have influenced their deci-
sion, only one indicated that as a possibility.58
More recently, and specific to the topic at hand, Andrew Wis-
trich—a federal magistrate judge in California—and his colleagues
conducted a study in which they found that the initial amount offered
by plaintiffs’ lawyers in a pretrial settlement conference, whether it be
high or low, created an anchor for how much trial judges would award
in compensatory damages.59
Much of my personal work focuses on issues of race. Given that
race remains such a contentious social issue, it serves as a catalyst for
impression management, with individuals seeking self- and others’
perceptions that they are racial egalitarians. The problem is that any-
where from seventy-five to ninety percent of whites, approximately
sixty percent of Latino and Asian Americans, and anywhere from
thirty-five to sixty percent of African Americans harbor automatic,
subconscious, anti-black/pro-white biases, as measured by the Implicit
Association Test.60 These findings are based on small, experimental
studies, as well as large, national data sets.61 More importantly, sub-
conscious biases are predictive of a range of behaviors, including the
use of racially divisive language, judgments of perceived threat and
hostility, guilt, and innocence; and they are predictive of judicial deci-
sion-making, especially where race is not a salient factor in the case.62
55. See id. at 243.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 243–44.
58. See id. at 244.
59. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2007); Chris Guth-
rie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL
L. REV. 777, 787–94 (2001).
60. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 48, at 958. R
61. Id. at 957.
62. See, e.g., John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasona-
ble Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive
Summary of Ten Studies that No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. 39, 47–48 (2009) (summarizing ten studies and concluding that subconscious
bias influences a wide range of behaviors).
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The point being that for the most part, when a judge makes ra-
cially insensitive comments, tells a racial joke, shares a racial email,
or states a policy position that negatively implicates race, they should
recuse themselves from cases where race can be implicated. It is not
that they are racists, per se, but rather that they are likely to be influ-
enced by automatic racial attitudes that they hold, or at the very least,
give the impression that they cannot be impartial decision makers. I’ll
end on that note.
REMARKS OF DMITRY BAM
I usually tell my students not to try to make two big points in five
minutes, but they’re not here, so I’m going to try to make two big
points. The first point I want to make is—and this really builds off
what Greg and Debra said—is that we’re all biased. We all have bi-
ases. If legal realism has taught us anything, it’s that. The way we
perceive the world depends in large part on our family, our exper-
iences, our race, and our gender, on what we believe when we encoun-
ter new information.63 And as somebody who writes about judicial
elections, I’m going to focus mostly on elected judges, but I’ll talk
about other kinds of biases that are out there.
We’ve talked a lot about money today, and money is an easy
target. It’s an easy target because it’s quantifiable; it’s easier to find a
solution when it comes to money, you can try to draw bright-line rules
about recusal depending on how much money you receive in a cam-
paign or how much money is spent on you. But money is just one
problem. I want to argue that there are at least two other problems.
One is at least as important, as big as money, and the other is much
bigger.
The former is the problem of judges promising, committing
themselves, to certain positions in the course of their campaigns. This
was the issue in the Republican Party of Minnesota v. White case,
when I was a law student in 2002, where the court said judges have
the right to announce their views, perhaps even promising to make
certain holdings.64 Clearly there’s not much of a difference between
saying, my view is that abortion is illegal under state law and I’m
going to do everything I can to stop it, versus actually promising to
stop abortion. Right? So judges, oftentimes if you look at current cam-
paigns, they make announcements, expose their views, make commit-
63. See generally, e.g., CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI: HOW STEREO-
TYPES AFFECT US AND WHAT WE CAN DO (2010) (addressing the role of stereotypes
in concepts of social identity).
64. 536 U.S. 765, 787–88 (2002).
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ments to rule a certain way,65 and once you’ve made those promises,
you better be careful about keeping them, because the voters are going
to hold you accountable next time. So that’s one big problem.
The other, the biggest problem, really, is the fact that judges fac-
ing election have to keep the electorate happy to keep their jobs. We
have lots of studies these days—for a long time we speculated that
judges might be biased in these cases, biased in favor of in-state inter-
ests, biased in favor of the political party that’s in power at the time
the election is coming up—and now we have the numbers to back it
up.66 I feel like every month there’s a new study showing judges are
biased in favor of in-state parties;67 and as Chief Justice Cobb men-
tioned last panel, judges impose harsher sentences as elections get
nearer—they impose more death penalties.68 So now we have those
numbers, and so we know that judges are biased. Those are big, im-
portant biases that we haven’t talked much about, that I think are just
as important as money.
Of course, elected judges are subject to the same biases—all of
the other biases—that every judge is subject to. And don’t forget, in
Caperton we had two other recusals, which we touched on earlier.69
One was based on friendship; if I had PowerPoint, you would see a
justice on the state supreme court on the Riviera with one of the par-
ties to the case. Justice Maynard eventually recused.70 But that’s a big
issue, and that’s a harder one to regulate. We saw something similar at
the U.S. Supreme Court, with Justice Scalia and Dick Cheney going
duck hunting together.71 How do you address that, those kinds of bi-
ases? So those are other, additional biases.
Of course personal characteristics matter as well. That’s the other
big piece. In one of my favorite recent studies, a couple of Harvard
65. In fact, special-interest groups often send questionnaires to judicial candidates
asking them to express their views on controversial issues. See, e.g., Rebecca Mae
Salokar, Endorsements in Judicial Campaigns: The Ethics of Messaging, 28 JUST.
SYS. J. 342, 347–48 (describing questionnaires special-interest groups use in the en-
dorsement process).
66. See, e.g., Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’
Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 172 (2009).
67. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the International
Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599, 601 (2005) (“We use more sophisti-
cated empirical tests, as well as more data, to show that, in fact, judges are signifi-
cantly biased in favor of their home states when that state appears as a party.”).
68. See supra pp. 579–80.
69. See supra p. 490.
70. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 874 (2009).
71. See, e.g., Steve Twomey, Scalia Angrily Defends His Duck Hunt with Cheney,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/18/politics/18CND-
SCAL.html.
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professors looked at judges with daughters, and how they decide cases
involving women’s rights.72 If you have a daughter or two daughters,
you decide sexual harassment cases differently, sexual discrimination
cases differently.73 “What you had for breakfast” might sound silly,
but there have been studies looking at Israeli judges where they im-
pose less punitive sentences immediately after lunch.74 So all those
things make a difference. We had an empathy debate with Justice
Sotomayor’s appointment, when President Obama said empathy is an
important piece of a Justice’s character, and Senator Sessions got up
on the floor and said, look, empathy’s just a code word, it’s about bias,
right? You want a judge who is biased.75 So there are all of these
biases out there, and they’re very hard to identify.
I want to finish with what might be a pessimistic note. Keith
Swisher opened today, he was the optimist;76 I’m going to take a pes-
simistic note. I don’t think recusal is the answer. I don’t think recusal
can solve the judicial-bias problem. We know these biases are out
there, and recusal is tempting as a solution, in part because there’s
seemingly no other solution, and in part because it seems so perfect at
the time. You have a biased judge? Well you can just get rid of that
biased judge, that’s the fix. And I want to suggest that this doesn’t
work for at least a couple of reasons.
One reason is one that others have already talked about, and eve-
ryone seems to agree on, which is that judges decide their own recusal
motions.77 I think this could be easily changed. I actually wrote an
article recently that that procedure is unconstitutional, not just prob-
lematic, because it puts the judge in the position of deciding their own
case.78 If you’re a lawyer you can make that argument, to be rejected
by the court, I’m sure. But even if you have other judges making these
decisions, judges like each other, and they don’t like recusal.79 Law-
72. See Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, Identifying Judicial Empathy: Does Having
Daughters Cause Judges to Rule for Women’s Issues?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37 (2015).
73. Id. at 45–47.
74. Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6889, 6889 (2011), http://www.pnas.org/content/108/17/6889.
75. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 7–8 (2009) (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions,
Ranking Member, Comm. on the Judiciary).
76. See supra pp. 484–89.
77. See supra pp. 500–03.
78. See Dmitry Bam, Our Unconstitutional Recusal Procedure, 84 MISS. L.J. 1135
(2015).
79. See, e.g., In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Judges asked to
recuse themselves hesitate to impugn their own standards; judges sitting in review of
others do not like to cast aspersions.”).
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yers hesitate to bring these motions.80 It’s almost impossible to create
a true adversarial process. We think of recusal as any other motion,
where you have two litigants getting together and filing a motion with
a judge, but that’s not what recusal is. Recusal is a dispute between a
judge and a litigant. So even if you bring it to another judge to decide
that dispute, it’s almost impossible to create an adversarial process.
And maybe we don’t even want to create an adversarial process,
where the litigant and the judge square off to decide whether or not
that judge should be recused.
And the final piece here, really the biggest one here, is if bias is
institutional, in the sense that elected judges are biased—and the num-
bers seem to back this up, of course not every judge in every case, but
statistically significant—then every elected judge is biased, so recusal
just can’t fix that problem. You can’t replace one elected judge with
another elected judge when both of them have to face the electorate,
which is going to be concerned about and focus on how that judge
decided each criminal case, and the judge will have to worry about
how a criminal case has been spun against them. These campaigns are
typically about who is the toughest on crime.81 So if you’re a judge,
you’ve got to be careful about those consequences.82 So that’s why I
think recusal doesn’t work, and also why I think it’s inconsistent with
the idea of elections. Think about an election. It’s about giving the
people a chance to decide—a sort of popular sovereignty, democratic
values—decide which values they prefer. It seems odd to remove the
judge who has made certain promises or commitments from being
able to exercise those promises and commitments.
So there are lots of problems here. I don’t have a great answer,
unfortunately, but I don’t think recusal is the answer at all to fix this
massive bias problem. I say in my articles that I think it’s the biggest
problem facing law, really all of law. My colleagues always say, yeah
you’re just saying that to appeal to 2L law review editors to accept
your articles, but no, that’s not the case. It really is, I think, the biggest
80. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and
the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 641 (2002) (discussing
concerns that lawyers have about bringing recusal motions in front of judges who will
ultimately decide those motions).
81. See, e.g, Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on
Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 328 (2010) (describing
“tough on crime” boasts in judicial election campaigns).
82. See, e.g., A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Message to Bench,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges
.html?_r=0 (describing the successful campaign to remove three justices on the Iowa
Supreme Court following a unanimous decision legalizing same-sex marriage).
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problem facing law. In ninety to ninety-five percent of all cases, all
judging is done by state judges, and about ninety percent of those are
elected judges, so that’s a lot of our legal work.83 And these are not
driver’s-licenses cases or bureaucratic cases, these are fundamental-
rights cases that decide questions on U.S. constitutional rights, on vot-
ing rights, abortion law, same-sex marriage—these are key, funda-
mental cases being decided by potentially biased judges.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Questions from Jed Shugerman to the Panelists
Jed Shugerman:
Great, there’s a lot on the table. I want to make sure we have
plenty of time for discussion, but I wanted to start with a couple of
questions to focus on. Dmitry ended with the problems, without neces-
sarily pinpointing solutions, but given that we’ve had several panelists
focus on the problems of implicit bias, I want to give just a couple
notes. Remember the doll study that was the focus of Brown v. Board
of Education?84 It wasn’t the most advanced social science—it was
early social science when it came to race and implicit associations. Dr.
Kenneth Clark gave white children and black children in the south
white and black dolls and asked for associations with those two dolls,
and found that both black and white children in Jim Crow South had
negative associations with the black doll and positive associations
with the white doll.85 And it turns out that those numbers were worse
in northern states than in southern states.86 And here’s another fun
fact: the study was replicated recently, and those numbers are even
83. See, e.g., Shugerman, Economic Crisis, supra note 6, at 1063 (“Almost ninety R
percent of state judges today face some kind of popular election.”).
84. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954). Dr. Kenneth Clark testified about the “doll test”
in Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), one of the cases consolidated into Brown.
See ANGELO N. ANCHETA, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW 53 (2006).
85. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 321 (2011) (describing
Dr. Clark’s testimony about the doll test).
86. See id.; see also JACK M. BALKIN, WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID 51 (2002); Chris Edelson, Judging in a Vacuum, or, Once More,
Without Feeling: How Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudential Approach Repeats Errors
Made in Plessy v. Ferguson, 45 AKRON L. REV. 513, 542 (2011); Note, Grade School
Segregation: The Latest Attack on Racial Discrimination, 61 YALE L.J. 730, 737
(1952).
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worse today, in 2014.87 And one more note about that: we’ve had
some reference to Mahzarin Banaji’s study,88 and the papers about
implicit bias. I actually have given my students access to that study
and asked them to look at it, and think about bias, all kinds of bias,
when I teach tort law. So given that lay of the land now, where we’re
more aware of implicit bias at least as decision-makers, what are the
solutions? Debra, in your writing you talked about education, trying to
use those resources.89 Here we’ve been talking about recusal, is that a
solution? Is better judicial selection a solution, and maybe more elec-
tions, not fewer? Maybe more accountability to the people, so that
people who are held over from an earlier era and are not moving into
the twenty-first century can be voted out of office? What do you think
about those solutions to implicit racial and gender bias?
Rex R. Perschbacher:
I have a couple responses. One, remember there’s also a part of (I
think) the ABA’s Section on Litigation study asking judges whether
they were above average or not at detecting and deflecting bias, and
ninety percent of the judges found that they were above average.90
This is not a criticism of judges, this is us, this is human beings, this is
the way in which we think about the world. Now I think recusal is not
the answer, but I don’t think there’s any better answer. That can be
my non-answer answer. I think that there’s some virtue in adopting
regimes where there’s more-or-less automatic recusal—Chief Judge
Lippman was talking about that in New York, where if you’re given a
certain amount of money you’re not going to hear the case, that’s
that.91 Because that would over time, I would hope, desensitize the
judges to recusal; as a judge, I would see that I’m not being accused
directly, I’m just following the law, this is what I have to do, I’m out
of here. I think those sorts of approaches that are more peremptory—
California of course uses a peremptory challenge for trial judges92—
those kinds of things would help.
87. See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Blackthink’s Acting White Stigma in Education
and How It Fosters Academic Paralysis in Black Youth, 50 HOW. L.J. 711, 749 n.14
(2006) (citing GIRL LIKE ME (Reel Works Teen Filmmaking 2005)).
88. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 17. R
89. See supra pp. 591–94.
90. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1225–26, 1226 n.127. R
91. See supra pp. 552–56.
92. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 170–170.9 (West 2015).
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Dmitry Bam:
But of course the peremptory piece doesn’t work when it’s im-
plicit bias. We don’t know our implicit bias ourselves, it’s subcon-
scious. The best answer I can think of is to try to look for evidence of
actual bias. Maybe that’s educating the public—one of the articles I
wrote is about giving the public more information on the ballot it-
self93—so having more neutral evaluations about judges, and if you
find evidence of a judge’s bias that is not just subconscious bias that
isn’t acted upon, but rather if there is bias that a judge acts upon,
somebody should be there to stop it. Who that somebody is, I think,
has to be the people. They’re the ones that are in charge here. A piece
I’m working on right now is about the jury as a check on judicial bias
and having more active roles for the jury, but those are the only possi-
ble solutions I can think of. Actually, we talked a lot about appear-
ances, but here I think there’s not much we can do with appearances—
here, we have to actually find evidence that some judges are acting in
a biased way, whether or not they have the implicit bias, in order to
have somebody step in and try to stop them.
Debra Lyn Bassett:
One of the benefits of the research being done into the Implicit
Association Test and unconscious bias is the idea that, by virtue of
making people aware of the fact that they have these implicit biases,
the educational component can help reduce bias.94 At this point what
they’ve developed so far has caused a temporary reduction, but at least
there has been a reduction in unconscious bias moving forward. The
hope is that as we get more and more psychological testing done, the
reduction will increase—they’ve been able to now extend what started
out as being a reduction lasting twenty-four hours to at least months,95
93. See Dmitry Bam, Voter Ignorance and Judicial Elections, 102 KY. L.J. 553
(2013).
94. See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1020–22
(2007); Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1223. R
95. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and
Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 801, 807 (2001) (not-
ing that in a study that “sought to test whether automatic negative attitudes can be
temporarily modified,” participants achieved a temporary modification of racial bias
lasting twenty-four hours); Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping):
Effects of Training in the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activa-
tion, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 871, 879 (2000) (measuring this effect
over a twenty-four-hour time frame); Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note
27, at 411–13, 415, 417–18 (emphasizing the temporary nature of reductions in im- R
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and so hopefully over time they’d be able to come up with something
that would help reduce it altogether. But I think the educational com-
ponent is absolutely crucial, because absent that awareness of the po-
tential for unconscious bias, I think people are all too comfortable
floating along thinking, “Who, me? I’m not biased. I can approach this
case objectively.” Think how often litigators use that in the juror con-
text—you know, a juror who has said something and then the lawyer
decides to try to rehabilitate them by saying, “But you can be fair,
right?” “Oh yes, I can be fair.” So, I think having the educational
component as at least one piece in the arsenal helps. And I agree that
judicial recusal or disqualification is not an absolutely perfect ap-
proach, but I’d sure hate to think of where we would be without it.
Without it, would we really always have to come up with some sort of
concrete proof of actual bias? I don’t think we’d be comfortable with
that either.
Gregory S. Parks:
I sort of agree with those arguments. I know the literature, and
yes, you can reduce an individual’s implicit biases by various meth-
ods, but the individual has to be motivated to want their biases re-
duced. So a judge that isn’t interested in going to any training because
they seriously don’t believe that they’re biased, or they believe that
these are philosophical views that they have and it’s not racial bias or
gender bias or bias against LBGT individuals, creates a conundrum.
I think that diversification of the bench is a good thing. It can
create some challenges in an elected judiciary. But there is a theory
called social tuning, which is sort of two theories: one theory is that
people aggregate to the middle, so if you have different ideas in the
mix, then individuals might not be so extreme.96 The other is that, at
plicit bias achieved in psychological studies); Laurie A. Rudman et al., “Unlearning”
Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856, 860 (2001) (decreased unconscious bias and stere-
otyping over a fourteen-week session); see also Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining
Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery,
81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 838 (2001) (stating that their “current data
cannot address the long-term consequences” of their counterstereotypic mental
imagery).
96. Myriam N. Bechtoldt et al., Motivated Information Processing, Social Tuning,
and Group Creativity, 99 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 622 (2010); Jeffrey R.
Huntsinger & Stacey Sinclair, When It Feels Right, Go with It: Affective Regulation of
Affiliative Social Tuning, 28 SOC. COGNITION 290, 291 (2010); Garriy Shteynberg, A
Silent Emergence of Culture: The Social Tuning Effect, 99 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 683, 687 (2010); Lian Shufang, A Study of Social Tuning Effect on Implicit
Stereotype, 27 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1046 (2004); Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of
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least when it comes to race, individuals—for example, whites who
have black friends, having a black friend does help reduce your bias,
because you get to see a black person as a person, and not someone on
TV, or in passing on the street.97
I do like the idea of recusal. With implicit bias the challenge is
that there’s not enough research to show how it plays out in various
forms of behavior. But there is some research. So when we have a
judge who makes racially insensitive comments, you can probably tie
that to implicit racial bias at the very least, even if the judge denies
that they’re racist.98 So if I can, I want to read something. February
20, 2012: Richard Cebull, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Montana, forwarded a racially charged email about
President Obama from his official courthouse email address. The sub-
ject line of the email read “A Mom’s Memory.” It contained the fol-
lowing text:
Normally I don’t send or forward a lot of these, but even by my
standards, it was a bit touching. I want all of my friends to feel
what I felt when I read this. Hope it touches your heart, like it did
mine. A little boy said to his mother, “Mommy, how come I’m
black and you’re white?” His mother replied, “Don’t even go there,
Barack. From what I can remember about the party, you’re lucky
you don’t bark.”99
Now it’s an interesting play on miscegenation, a white woman
and a dog, but the usual play here is actually what you saw a lot in the
election, and post-election, and post–second election, associating the
president with various forms of non-human primates.100
Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role of Affiliative Motivation, 89 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 583, 584 (2005); Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of the Self:
Consequences for the Self-Evaluations of Stereotype Targets, 89 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 160, 161 (2005).
97. Christopher L. Aberson et al., Implicit Bias and Contact: The Role of Inter-
ethnic Friendships, 144 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 335 (2004); Tiffany Brannon & Gregory M.
Walton, Enacting Cultural Interests: How Intergroup Contact Reduces Prejudice by
Sparking Interest in an Out-Group’s Culture, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1947 (2013); Heidi
Elizabeth McGlothlin, Children’s Decision-Making About Social Relationships: The
Impact of Similarity, Racial Attitudes, and Intergroup Contact (2004) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park), http://drum.lib.umd.edu/
bitstream/handle/1903/1489/umi-umd-1441.pdf?sequence=1.
98. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. R
99. See M.J. Lee, Judge Admits to Anti-Obama Email, POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2012,
6:14 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73486.html.
100. See, e.g., Dan Amira, GOP Official Who E-mailed an Obama Monkey Photo
Won’t Resign, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 20, 2011, 10:10 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelli
gencer/2011/04/gop_official_wont_resign_over.html; Catherine Taibi, Belgian News-
paper Accused of Racism for Picture of Obama and Michelle as Apes, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 24, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/24/news
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The challenge here was that Chief Judge Cebull’s response, when
called on the carpet, was, I received this email from my brother, it is
indeed racist, so my brother must be racist but I’m not. I simply for-
warded the email.101 After Chief Judge McKee in the Third Circuit
pressured the Ninth Circuit to do a closer review of other emails sent
by Chief Judge Cebull, it revealed that he had sent many racist,
homophobic, and sexist emails,102 which underscored that even if he
wanted to believe he is not a racist, he does harbor automatic, anti-
black, maybe anti-whole-range-of-other-people attitudes.
Now this wasn’t an issue about recusal, but I sure as hell would
hate to be a black man in front of this judge in court in any kind of
case. Luckily, he stepped down. So pushing back a little bit on your
contention, Dmitry, I think recusal could be useful in certain circum-
stances, though probably not as widespread as one might hope.
Dmitry Bam:
Let me just clarify: I love recusal. I think it works in situations
like that, and I think it’s something we shouldn’t abandon. I just don’t
think it’s the answer. I don’t think it solves the bulk of the problem.
When you have a judge who writes racially insensitive emails, that
judge should be recused. In the campaign contribution context, in
cases like Caperton, I think Justice Benjamin should have been dis-
qualified and should have recused. It’s just whether or not recusal can
really solve the bias, the core of the bias problem, and I don’t think so.
Caperton came out when I really started writing about this topic, and
when I was in law school the White case came out, where Justice
paper-obama-ape-belgian-satire-putin-barack-president-racism-racist_n_5020987.
html; South Korea Compares Obama to a Monkey, N.Y. POST (Dec. 26, 2014, 11:48
PM), http://nypost.com/2014/12/26/n-korea-calls-obama-a-monkey-blames-us-for-
web-crash/. For a more recent example, see Univision Host Fired for Calling Obama
an Ape, USA TODAY (Mar. 12, 2015, 3:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/
people/2015/03/12/univisions-rodner-figueroa-fired-for-michelle-obama-comment/
70220006/.
101. See Lee, supra note 99 (“I didn’t send it as racist, although that’s what it is. I R
sent it out because it’s anti-Obama.”).
102. See, e.g., Clair Johnson, 3rd Circuit Chief Judge Satisfied with Cebull Investi-
gation, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Jan. 29, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://billingsgazette.com/
news/local/crime-and-courts/rd-circuit-chief-judge-satisfied-with-cebull-investigation/
article_cca958e1-3316-579e-8bf6-a81d7d799416.html; Matt Volz, Former U.S. Dis-
trict Judge Richard Cebull Sent Hundreds of Bigoted Emails Throughout Tenure,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2014, 10:39 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
01/18/richard-cebull_n_4623151.html; Annie Youderian, Judge Probe Reveals More
Inappropriate Emails, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Jan. 19, 2014, 10:22 PM), http://
www.courthousenews.com/2014/01/19/64654.htm.
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Kennedy said recusal can be the answer to these problems.103 So for
me it was love at first sight with recusal. It’s just, and I’ve written
papers about this,104 I just don’t think when we get to the real main
problem—which is about elected judges thinking about their job pros-
pects, and elected judges making promises and commitments on the
campaign trail that bias their decisions—I just don’t see recusal as
solving those problems.
Jed Shugerman:
Let me push on this a little bit more, because I think we want to
distinguish between the cases of explicit racism, which happen but
only are signifiers, or are only symbolic, of how widespread implicit
bias is, but people aren’t aware of implicit bias, so I personally found
it eye-opening when I and my friends, both white and black, took the
Mahzarin Banaji Implicit Association Test. You have to hit buttons—
so instead of just coming up with words loosely, they show pictures,
faces, and then because of the faces you see and the words you see
you have to immediately respond with hitting on the keyboard either
the left side of the keyboard or the right side of the keyboard, and if
you don’t answer in half a second it doesn’t register.105 So it has to be
immediate. When I took this test and others took this test, white and
black, we were all surprised at how much we were racists. We all had
negative associations with black faces and more positive associations
with white faces, white or black. So it replicated the studies of the
dolls.106 So here are just two suggestions for the panel: one is requir-
ing all judges to take this test. The judge will say, “I’m not a racist.”
Well it turns out, you take this test and it turns out you do have these
biases. Just to push a little further, a modest proposal: then publish the
results of those studies. So you have an index of which judges have
the strongest implicit biases, and then those can be the basis for
recusal or disqualification motions. So, how about that brave new
world?
Debra Lyn Bassett:
The first part is already being done. That’s exactly what the ABA
Section on Litigation and the National Center for State Courts are do-
103. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 802 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
104. See, e.g., Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appear-
ance of Bias, 2011 BYU L. REV. 943 (2011).
105. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 17. R
106. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
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ing in their workshops and programs that they’re offering for judges,
for sitting judges.107 They offer these workshops for implicit bias and
part of the workshop is taking the Implicit Association Test, so they
can see firsthand how it works, and the reaction has been overwhelm-
ingly positive. It’s been sort of an “oh my goodness, I had no idea.”
And the judges have responded very favorably, and think this is very
valuable information that they’ve learned.108 And just kind of a half-
step back, the creators of the IAT, Anthony Greenwald at the Univer-
sity of Washington and Mahzarin Banaji at Harvard, have repeatedly
said that the result of this test does not automatically mean that you
are a racist, it means you harbor these biases.109 Maybe that’s drawing
a fine line, but they don’t want people to have the idea that a strong
race bias on the test automatically translates into the person being a
racist, perhaps for obvious reasons. Because of largely vicarious ex-
periences—that’s what they’re seeing in culture, that’s what they’ve
experienced—most of us carry these more negative associations with
respect to race and gender and age and disability.
Rex R. Perschbacher:
I think it is both fair and unfair to say that judges are some of the
toughest people to be in this position. They get every day people say-
ing, “You’re great, I love all of your opinions.” That’s just the way in
which lawyers, in particular, tend to interact with judges. And for
them to have to face saying, “I’m a racist, what do you mean?” is
going to be very, very difficult. So I think judges have the hardest job
of all in facing these situations. I’m glad Dmitry is on the side of
recusal, at least part of the time. As I say, I think more automatic rules
would work better, because they might eliminate some of the accusa-
tory notions that are behind all this. So instead of “You’re a racist,
you’re biased,” “What do you mean?” it’d be nice to have more auto-
matic rules that knock people off, and they adapt to that, and that’s
just the way it is.
107. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 26, at 6; Drummond, supra note 26, at 20–21 R
(reporting on the ABA’s creation of a program addressing implicit bias in the
judiciary).
108. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 26, at 21 (reporting that with respect to the pilot R
judicial education programs in California, Minnesota, and North Dakota, “at least
80% of participants who responded to assessment questions in each state expressed
satisfaction with the implicit bias program and saw its applicability to their work,” and
noting that “[t]heir comments used adjectives such as excellent, valuable, important,
relevant, informative, worthwhile, and eye-opening to describe their reactions to the
programs”).
109. See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT:
HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013).
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Jed Shugerman:
Why don’t we open it up to questions?
Question from Doug Lindner to the Panelists
Doug Lindner:
Thank you all for being here. My name is Doug Lindner; I’m a
student here at the law school. My question for the whole panel is: I
wonder if you have thoughts on whether the process of judicial selec-
tion has some effect on implicit political bias. Not just the issues of
race, gender, et cetera, but also things like the environment of worship
or any other issue that very politically active people may have stronger
feelings about.
Rex R. Perschbacher:
Let me respond. Yes! Why does the President of the United
States choose the people on the U.S. Supreme Court? Why does the
governor of the State of California, second-time-around-governor,
choose the people that he chooses for the bench? Because of the way
they act politically, because of the steps they’ll take. So I think there’s
no question that, at the higher-court levels certainly, maybe less so at
the trial-court level, that the people chosen are chosen for deeply polit-
ical reasons and it would be shocking to find them going contrary to
that. I think we’re just addressing things that come up in the course of
their time on the judiciary where they may have an opportunity to step
aside. So, yes, people are chosen politically. Look, in my state, Cali-
fornia, we haven’t had a direct recent history of judges being thrown
off the bench because of their views, but we had a time in the 1970s I
think it was, the late 1970s, when three members of the state supreme
court were removed.110 The first Governor Brown, in his first adminis-
tration, put them on—and maybe he was more careless then—he put
them on the court, they voted against the death penalty every single
time, and they were pushed off the court through a retention election
in which they were not retained. The people who were voting knew
what they were going to get because the new governor, Deukmejian,
110. The removal of three justices from the Supreme Court of California occurred in
a 1986 retention election. See G. Alan Tarr, Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme
Court Justices, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1445, 1446 (2003); John T. Wold & John H.
Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the
Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348, 348–49 (1986).
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was very harsh on law-and-order issues.111 The people who sponsored
the campaign were largely business groups who wanted a change in
the law of another sort.112 I don’t think there’s any magical solution in
the appointment process or the response process that’ll fix these
things.
Dmitry Bam:
We had a similar situation in Iowa, just a couple of years ago,
where there were justices who voted in favor of same-sex marriage
and got voted out of office in a retention election, which used to be
completely safe.113 So, undoubtedly, judges have to be conscious of
what’s going to get them elected, what’s going to keep their jobs. I
think the problem is even worse at the trial level where you know as a
trial judge that each one of your decisions could be used against you in
the next election, and that could drive the electorate against you. So
that’s why they are really cautious in cases that have high ceilings,
which are usually criminal cases. You have to be cautious about how
you sentence people, because if somebody gets out of prison and com-
mits another crime, that’s going to be what the next campaign is all
about.
Jed Shugerman:
But judicial elections can be a red herring here. So let me take
each of those examples and add another one. So in the example of
111. See William Blum, Day of the Locust, 75 A.B.A. J. 108, 108 (1989) (reviewing
JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: REFLECTIONS OF A STATE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE  (1989)) (noting that at the time of the retention election, former Gov-
ernor Brown “was on his way out, to be replaced by the staunchly conservative
George Deukmejian, the former state attorney general . . . [who] had climbed on the
law-and-order bandwagon”).
112. See id. (stating that the opposition to the California justices was funded by
“sizeable contributions from oil and gas interests, insurance companies, and real-es-
tate and agricultural associations”); Frank Clifford, Financial Impact on Campaign:
Stands on Civil Cases Stir Praise, Criticism of Bird, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 1986), http://
articles.latimes.com/1986-03-09/news/mn-17892_1_bird (noting that “business inter-
ests have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to defeat [the California justices]”
and citing accusations that the justices were “anti-business” and “anti-insurance”);
Tom Wicker, Opinion, In the Nation; A Naked Power Grab, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14,
1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/14/opinion/in-the-nation-a-naked-power-
grab.html (noting that “a deeper motive of the business groups involved in the anti-
Bird campaign—big contributors include the Independent Oil Producers Agency and
the Western Growers Association—was suggested when Crime Victims for Court Re-
form issued a paper charging the Bird court with being ‘anti-business’”).
113. See Sharyn Jackson, Iowa Gay Marriage Ruling a Turning Point for Justices,
USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2014, 11:40 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2014/04/02/iowa-gay-marriage-ruling-a-turning-point-for-justices/7237453/.
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Rose Bird in California, if she were up for reappointment by
Deukmejian, he would have never reappointed her. You take the Iowa
judges with Governor Branstad, who helped orchestrate the anti–gay
marriage campaign114—he would have never reappointed those three
Iowa judges either. And Penny White, who has been a strong voice for
reform, was a Democrat who was largely pro-death penalty on the
Tennessee Supreme Court. She voted in one case, where there was a
pretty strong procedural argument, to vacate a death sentence but still
keep the killer in jail for the rest of his life.115 That one case she was a
concurring opinion on, and she was tossed off the bench.116 The gov-
ernor at the time, Sundquist, said she should have known better,117 and
no doubt, if it was up to the governor, she would not have been reap-
pointed, and the legislature—they also would like to be governor one
day—they would have cracked down on those three judges even
harder.
So again, I think elections are messy for a bunch of unique rea-
sons, like with money being so direct. But the politics are still behind
the scenes in appointments. The money is still behind the scenes. In
some ways it’s scarier with appointments because of how the special
interests are less transparent—there’s less disclosure. Basically the
governor and the legislature are organized political action committees,
or the donor committees, because the judge doesn’t get the money, but
they know the governor and the legislature would be and they’re going
to be picking them and not picking them. So there isn’t the same op-
portunity for disclosure. So in some way I think the election-versus-
appointment debate obscures these other problems. Again, length of
term is the thing I want to focus on the most, along with a selection
process that doesn’t privilege any one body or any one actor or any
one corrupt force, but basically uses pluralism to direct the corruption
114. See, e.g., O. Kay Henderson, Hatch Says Branstad Will Use ‘Bully Pulpit’ to
Push for Same-Sex Marriage Ban, RADIO IOWA (Sept. 22, 2014), http://
www.radioiowa.com/2014/09/22/hatch-says-branstad-will-use-bully-pulpit-to-push-
for-same-sex-marriage-ban/ (reporting on statements by Iowa’s Governor Branstad re-
garding the potential passage of a same-sex marriage ban within the state).
115. See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. 1996).
116. See Colman McCarthy, Injustice Claims a Tennessee Judge, WASH. POST (Nov.
26, 1996), http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1996/11/26/injustice-
claims-a-tennessee-judge/f0a28c33-fcb1-4c1b-9471-2d5704d56a88/.
117. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done
amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Justices from Office for Unpopular Deci-
sions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 310 (1997) (quoting then-Governor Sundquist as re-
sponding to Penny White’s defeat: “Should a judge look over his shoulder [when
making decisions] about whether they’re going to be thrown out of office? I hope
so.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYL\18-3\NYL305.txt unknown Seq: 29 16-NOV-15 8:56
2015] CAPERTON’S NEXT GENERATION 615
forces against each other. That way these forces all check the worst of
the candidates, so they’re left with perhaps more mediocre but less
corrupt judges—or, ideally, better judges who through their merit rise
above the special interests because everyone can agree that if they
can’t get their crony, they’ll at least say that this person is the best
candidate out there because they’re the best at the rule of law, and we
can at least trust that even if we haven’t grabbed them with our dol-
lars. So I think we need to think about this in a more complicated way
than simply “elections are bad.”
Rex R. Perschbacher:
Can I just add one thing: there are a couple of notable examples
where federal judges who are not subject to retention elections have
been picked on. Constance Baker Motley, a long time ago here in New
York, was picked on as well. “She’s a woman, she’s black, she hates
whites.”118 She says, I’m either going to be black or white, I’m either
going to be a man or a woman119—but maybe it’s not that simple
today. In California recently with the same-sex marriage cases,
Vaughn Walker, a federal district judge who was widely accepted as
probably gay,120 voted to strike down the laws restricting marriage to
between a man and a woman.121 He was then immediately accused of,
and there was a whole hearing on, his bias—about whether he was just
doing this for personal gain, because then he could get married to his
long-time lover.122 That was rejected, but these accusations are made.
118. See generally Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4–5 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (denying a motion for recusal based in part on the argument that the judge
would be influenced in her decision by a personal identification with a black female
plaintiff); Amber Fricke & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Do Female “Firsts” Still Mat-
ter? Why They Do for Female Judges of Color, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1529, 1544
(noting “the commonly held misperception that women of color cannot be neutral
arbiters,” and observing that some women of color have “face[d] requests for recusal
from a discrimination lawsuit on the ground that they may identify with those who
have suffered from race and/or sex discrimination”); Martha Minow, Stripped Down
Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Ju-
rors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1207–08 (1992) (elaborating on the implica-
tions of the controversy involving Judge Motley).
119. Blank, 418 F. Supp. at 4–5.
120. See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Court Reporter: Judge’s Gay-Marriage Ruling Now Em-
braced, WALL ST. J.: WASH. WIRE (Feb. 21, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
washwire/2014/02/21/court-reporter-judges-gay-marriage-ruling-now-embraced/ (ob-
serving that “[a]lthough it’s now known that Judge Walker himself is gay, few would
have expected his role in marriage law” at the time he was first appointed to the
federal bench).
121. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
122. See Maura Dolan, Gay Judge Wasn’t Required to Remove Himself from Same-
Sex Marriage Case, U.S. Judge Rules, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2011), http://articles.la
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So I do sympathize with judges. You make one—just one—mistake,
that’s all it will take, and you could be booted off the bench in an
election. I kind of like the non-election long-term situation.
Jed Shugerman:
Other questions?
Question from Hugh Campbell to the Panelists
Hugh Campbell:
My name is Hugh Campbell, I’m not an attorney so forgive me if
I use the wrong terms. All the panels seem to bring up money at some
point, and in many cases dark money, and the desire perhaps by the
ABA and especially some of the judiciary committees of the ABA to
have more disclosure. Have these committees weighed in with the
SEC on putting on the calendar, about public companies making dis-
closure? And if they haven’t, should they?
Jed Shugerman:
I might just invoke that the panel’s title is “Beyond the Bank,”
and so it’s beyond the jurisdiction of this panel to talk about the SEC
and banking policy. Is that fair?
Rex R. Perschbacher:
The ABA for a long time had a bunch of rules about economics.
Money is actually easier to deal with than all the things we’ve been
talking about here, as I think my co-panelists here were saying, be-
cause the ABA had a set of rules, where if you have any economic
interest in a case you couldn’t sit on the case.123 Those have been cut
back a little bit now, but I think money turns out to be a simple thing.
The kinds of bias we are talking about are really difficult.
Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists
Audience Member:
We have judges and we have people who know they are fair-
minded, really know it. And then we have people who are fair-
minded, but will say, “I think I can sit in this case, but I can under-
stand if somebody else reasonably doesn’t think so.” Now, you talked
times.com/2011/jun/15/local/la-me-0615-gay-judge-20110616 (describing the recusal
hearing and decision).
123. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.11(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011).
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about the subconscious. I’d like to suggest that the recusal does tend to
surface things from the subconscious, or at least you use words to
address them. But what do we know about that particular turn of mind
that will see the other side and act upon it with a kind of understand-
ing of the reasonable layman’s view of the case?
Debra Lyn Bassett:
In terms of where that line is between somebody who says, “I’m
not biased,” but maybe they really are biased, versus someone who
says, “I’m not biased, I know I’m not biased, but I do understand
where the perception might come from”?
Audience Member:
How do some people get that way and other people don’t? And
do you train for that?
Debra Lyn Bassett:
I actually do think that, in part, that’s a piece of what these cur-
rent programs are trying to do through educating judges—sitting
judges—to understand this phenomenon of unconscious bias so they
can get to the point where they can see “oh!” And the program, al-
though it invokes the Implicit Association Test so they can see some
of their own reactions, is also generally reminding people about diver-
sity and other kinds of matters.124 This helps them see more readily
where perceptions can differ, and where—even though they may be-
lieve down deep in their hearts that they’re not biased at all, or that if
they have some biases that they can nevertheless rise above those bi-
ases and act fairly—the educational component is trying to help them
see that sometimes those perceptions can exist nonetheless. So I think
that’s about the best answer I have, maybe Gregory has a better one
than that.
124. See, e.g., Casey et al., supra note 20, at 6; see also Helping Courts Address R
Implicit Bias: Resources for Education, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://
www.ncsc.org/ibeducation (last visited Sept. 1, 2015) (providing links to articles and
resources on implicit bias); Implicit Bias Initiative, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias.html (last
visited Sept. 1, 2015) (providing links to three videos developed by the Education
Division of the Administrative Office of the Courts for California that “review[ ] the
science of implicit bias and offer[ ] suggestions for approaching this issue”).
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Gregory S. Parks:
No, I would concur with that. I think for individuals, judges, be-
ing scientifically sophisticated helps them make that judgment. And
the question is: how many state courts are actually doing this kind of
training? Not a lot. I know that, I clerked on the Fourth Circuit, and
my judge, Andre Davis, participated in Duke’s L.L.M. program for
judges about empiricism and law. I don’t know if my judge finished
his thesis yet, but I think judges who are willing to take this informa-
tion in and not resist it are probably more inclined to make good judg-
ments about their own bias. What’s troublesome are the judges who
believe that they are not biased, that no one can tell them they’re bi-
ased, whether at the explicit or implicit level across any range of cate-
gories—yes, hardheaded ones.
Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists
Audience Member:
I’d like to push a little bit harder on this thought that recusal
could function in response to gender or racial bias. So one thought
about recusal is that that judge is qualified to be a judge and can sit as
a judge on cases, but just not this particular case. And if you had
enough information to demonstrate that because of gender or racial
bias that judge should not sit on that case, aren’t you really saying that
judge should not be a judge at all?
Debra Lyn Bassett:
I think that what’s going on with the programs that the ABA is
doing is just making them think about whether this could be a factor. I
don’t think they’re trying to come out and say, “You are a racist, you
are a sexist, you are an ageist, you are somebody who discriminates
always on the basis of disability.” I think what they are trying to do is
just educate the judges that these biases do exist, that these are within
ourselves, and that by virtue of reminding ourselves—judges in partic-
ular, but all of us—if we all remind ourselves that most of us do har-
bor these biases, and if we make ourselves more aware of that on a
regular basis, that can help—not eliminate, but help—to mitigate that
bias. And if indeed someone has risen to the level where they are not
just having some of these unconscious biases but they are actually
actively racist or sexist or whatever, then, of course, arguably that per-
son shouldn’t be a sitting judge. But that’s not what this educational
program is about. What this educational program is about is heighten-
ing awareness, so you will not so blindly walk into situations. You
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won’t just assume, “Well, hey, I’m educated, so therefore how can I
possibly harbor any racist or sexist or other kinds of biases.” It’s an
increased self-awareness, that’s what it’s about.
Gregory S. Parks:
I would concur with that. I make a sharp distinction between be-
ing a racist and having implicit racial biases. Racist is a very high
standard. You use the “N-word” frequently, well this gets compli-
cated, and you’re not an African American around other African
Americans, but you use it as an epithet and you explicitly despise Af-
rican Americans. You’re a member of the Ku Klux Klan. You’re a
racist, right? The challenge with implicit bias is that, especially around
issues of race, so many people have them. Like the numbers I gave,
seventy-five to ninety percent of whites, approximately sixty percent
of Latino and Asian Americans, and thirty to sixty-five percent of Af-
rican Americans suggest that it is in the ether, that it is in the environ-
ment that we all take in; and so to say that a judge cannot be a judge
because they have implicit racial or gender or sexual orientation biases
would mean we probably wouldn’t have judges. And so, the question
is, what do we do then, once we know that so many people have im-
plicit or automatic biases? To my co-panelist’s point, we try to edu-
cate them. We hope for the best. We hope that they are actually
interested in not being biased, that they will want to continue to do
things that will militate against their automatic associations with racial
categories, gender, sexual orientation, and positively and negatively
valenced concepts and words. So, that’s my point. I think you have to
make a sharp distinction between a sexist, a racist, a homophobe, and
someone who simply has an automatic preference or bias.
Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists
Audience Member:
Thank you, I just had a quick question. There is one type of bias
that I don’t think anyone has really touched upon, but I’d just be curi-
ous as to the panel’s views on this. It’s a simple fact—I guess for lack
of a better word I’d call it professional bias—the fact that unlike in
some countries where judges are trained from law school or shortly
thereafter to become judges and to think (hopefully) as impartially as
possible, the judges here, whether appointed or elected, all come for
the most part from a professional background and they bring their per-
sonal experience, whether it’s from the plaintiffs’ bar or the prosecu-
tor’s office or otherwise. Obviously, having been an advocate for
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many years, it’s not a bad thing necessarily to have a bias in that
context, but how do you turn the switch off? I was curious to see
whether anyone has empirically measured the effect of those types of
very obvious professional biases on the way cases get decided, be-
cause I would think it’s probably one of the first things that people
look at when they’re doing research on a particular judge: what’s their
background? Where do they come from? What’s their point of view?
Dmitry Bam:
Yeah, there was that—I forget the author now, somebody will
probably remember it, there was a great book that came out just a
couple years ago called The Judge-Lawyer Bias, which looks at how
judges make decisions that are sort of in favor of the legal profes-
sion.125 They try to make laws more complicated, try to make lives
better for lawyers.126 I can’t remember the author, but it’s a great book
and he’s done a lot of sort of empirical work. There are other kinds of
biases that stem from that, as well. I mentioned friendships, right? I
mean, that’s what happens when you have judges who come from the
ranks of lawyers, who were partners in the same firm. You can have a
lot more friendships, and you have to try to figure out how you’re
going to deal with those kinds of biases that really result from the fact
that judges didn’t go to special judge school with their own little com-
munity like is common in Europe, but really are just lawyers at heart.
Gregory S. Parks:
Following up on what we’ve been talking about, which is educat-
ing judges: so, implicit racial or gender bias is only one kind or two
kinds of cognitive biases that are out there. There are dozens of differ-
ent types of cognitive biases. And so I know my mentor at Cornell,
Jeff Rachlinski, when he travels around the country and goes to judi-
cial conferences, he actually collects data and he gives a presenta-
tion—so the judges get some benefit, and he gets a publication—and
what he does is he tries to educate them about cognitive biases that are
much broader than simple implicit racial, gender, and sexual-orienta-
tion biases.127 The Wistrich article that I just mentioned with Chris
125. See BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 23 (2010).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Heuristics
and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges, 163 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 167
(2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bank-
ruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guth-
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Guthrie, Dean of Vanderbilt Law School, and Jeff Rachlinski, who’s
at Cornell Law School, is simply focused on anchoring—how large
numbers and small numbers sort of orient a person as to what kind of
settlement figure they would come up with or damages award they
would come up with.128 So I know that there are individuals out there
who are actually trying to train judges around broader notions of what
cognitive biases are, and maybe how to address them, but I’m not sure
if they focus on the specific one that you talk about.
Jed Shugerman:
One point to add is that I was making an argument for merit
selection earlier, but one of the big downsides of merit selection is that
a big player in that process is the state bar association. So we’re talk-
ing about replicating the profession—in fact, you’re giving them a
seat at the table to pick who gets sent to the governor on that list of
three. So here are a couple more layers to that. First of all, it turns out
when they did studies of Missouri—of what is often called the Mis-
souri Plan, because they are one of the innovators of it129—studies
showed that it was equally balanced between the plaintiffs’ bar, the
big plaintiffs’ bar, and the big defense bar, but there were no labor
lawyers who got appointed and, surprisingly, no criminal defense law-
yers. They’re out no matter what with this process we have in
America. So that’s one angle. The other problem with merit selection,
at least in the past, is that we’re talking about how to counteract im-
plicit bias. Studies in the ’70s and ’80s found that these merit selection
systems produce more white men for the bench, whereas the parties—
whether Democrat or Republican—were more likely to nominate fe-
male and racial-minority candidates, in part because they were more
accountable to the broader public whereas the bar still was largely run
by white men.130 Query whether this has changed a bit as the bar has
changed in the twenty-first century, but it certainly seems to lag be-
hind society, so that’s certainly in my mind a mark against the merit
system despite its other advantages.
rie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
128. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. R
129. See MAUREEN O’CONNOR, OHIO COURTS 2013: A PROPOSAL FOR STRENGTHEN-
ING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1, 3 (2013), http://ohiojudicialreform.org/wp-content/re-
sources/Plan13.pdf.
130. See, e.g., Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Diversity in State and Fed-
eral Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity Across 20 Years, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 47,
51–54 (2008) (comparing diversity on the bench between the years 1985 and 2005).
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Question from Leonard Horowitz to the Panelists
Leonard Horowitz:
Thank you. My name is Leonard Horowitz. I have a broad ques-
tion for you. It seems to me that impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality are a bedrock of democracy, and we’re having now—and
it’s probably happened for a long time, but I think it’s more apparent
now than maybe ever before—we’re seeing important decisions come
with political bias. Cases, especially in the health care act cases and
the voter ID cases, are being decided on strictly political lines, which
seems to me to be a very dangerous trend, and potentially taking away
confidence in the judicial system. I would wonder if you would com-
ment on that, please.
Rex R. Perschbacher:
I don’t have a helpful comment—I think that’s true! Personally,
anyway. Yes, our society is becoming much more politicized in every
sort of way. We used to just worry about lawyers getting into every-
thing, but now it’s politicians, I guess, getting into everything. And I
don’t think there’s a darn thing we can do about it from the bias point
of view.
Dmitry Bam:
Yeah, part of the question is: we can describe lots of things as
biases, but it’s very hard to define what exactly we want to get rid of,
so what is impartiality, right? I think we’ve sort of accepted the fact
that partisan preferences, political preferences, play an important role
in judges’ decisions. We’ve known this for a long time but pretended
for a long time that it wasn’t the case—but we’ve known for a long
time now that judges’ backgrounds and their political preferences
shape how they view the world, and I think we’ve just come to the
conclusion that that’s not the kind of impartiality that we demand. In
the Republican Party of Minnesota v. White case that we’ve talked
about a couple of times, the court grapples with defining impartial-
ity.131 And one of the definitions that Justice Scalia rejects is complete
open-mindedness—sort of a clean slate, “I’m accepting every argu-
ment”—and he says we don’t want that kind of impartiality.132 We
select judges based on their views. We want them to be educated,
having made up their minds on certain issues, and just because I, Jus-
131. 536 U.S. 765, 775–79 (2002).
132. Id. at 778.
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tice Scalia, have made up my mind on abortion and you’ve seen that
view in my decisions, that doesn’t mean I’m not impartial. I’m still
impartial; I just have a legal view that has shaped my political and
partisan preferences.
Question from Susan Lerner
Susan Lerner:
I think it’s interesting—I’m Susan Lerner by the way—to look at
the trial-court level in Los Angeles over a period of time, starting with
Jerry Brown in his first incarnation and going all the way through to
now. There’s a tremendous transition in terms of the sorts of people
appointed or elected. Los Angeles for the trial court, and California in
general, have the mixed system: it’s appointed, judges are appointed
not from a panel, just generally—unless there has been no appoint-
ment when the election comes up for that particular seat, in which case
it becomes an open seat and anybody can run.133 And my friends who
are judges in Los Angeles pointed out that a big emphasis in the past
twenty years is prosecutors are appointed to the bench there, and in
fact when you interview them for evaluations and you say, “Why do
you want to go on the bench?” some of them actually say, “well, it’s
the next step in my career! I’ve done what I can in the DA’s office.”
So you get that bias, but the election then ends up being a break from
that process because people who have different backgrounds are able
to run. So it isn’t always the case that elections work in a negative
way. But just in response to your comments about Scalia’s comments
and the biases, and I’m forgetting the Ninth Circuit conservative judge
who wrote a beautiful book almost ten years ago now where he said
that the most important quality of a judge is the ability to continue to
learn and grow on the bench. And don’t we have a problem with some
of the judges who have been appointed—particularly, from my bias,
that come through the Federalist Society who have their formed opin-
ions, and are not listening to the litigants and who are not learning and
growing on the bench but rather putting everything into the box that
they came with, and isn’t that a problem?
Jed Shugerman:
On this question, Linda Greenhouse just wrote a piece yesterday
called Law in the Raw, and the point was that we’ve reached a new era
133. See Methods of Selection: California, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state=
CA (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
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where judges are just politicians in robes.134 And my reaction is, wel-
come to the party, Linda! I mean, just look at American history. They
were literally politicians in robes throughout the entire nineteenth cen-
tury. They were actually running from the bench; during Lincoln’s
presidency and right after, Lincoln’s appointees were all people who
had political ambition—this is sort of the book A Team of Rivals, that
shows that many of these appointments were specifically because they
were rivals to Lincoln and he kept his coalition together, and many of
them harbored presidential ambitions from the bench.135 Charles Ev-
ans Hughes resigned from the Supreme Court to run for President.136
And so they were deeply political in the nineteenth century, and
deeply biased in the nineteenth century obviously as well. The Su-
preme Court was attacked for being political through the Lochner era,
and through the New Deal era, and it was always on the conservative
end until it was deeply political on the left for about fifteen years. I
liked those decisions in general, but they were political. Earl Warren
was a politician who only got on the Supreme Court because he was a
successful politician and because he had been a challenger in 1952 for
the Republican nomination.137 So it’s a proud tradition in America,
unlike in other countries, to appoint politicians to the bench. So
whether we have elected judges formally, or politicians appointed, it’s
deeply in the American judicial fabric.
Okay, so that sounds negative. Rex talked about European judges
and why they don’t talk about the appearance of bias as much—it’s
because they’re bureaucratic functionaries. Do we want the European
system, where if you get the right grades coming out of a European
law school, you’re selected to go from college right into judge school
without doing anything else with your life, and then you’re literally a
self-promoter?138 Academics do that too, right? But European judges
work their way up; they promote themselves without ever meeting a
non-judge or non-lawyer. And so Europeans haven’t exactly gotten
the right balance, either, but somewhere between the two may be a
better mean.
134. See Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Law in the Raw, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/13/opinion/law-in-the-raw.html.
135. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, at xvi (2005).
136. See, e.g., Jill Lepore, Benched, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2012), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/06/18/benched.
137. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992).
138. See SHUGERMAN, supra note 1, at 5. R
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Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists
Audience Member:
Yes, I think that two barriers to exposing judges’ biases are, num-
ber one, the judges’ ability to alter transcripts of the hearings, and
secondly, closed courtrooms. Although in New York it’s supposed to
be open courtrooms, that’s not the case all the time in Queens family
courts, and I think those are two barriers.
Dmitry Bam:
On the second piece I just want to say that I agree that more
openness is part of the answer, more exposure to the public. Jocelyn
Simonson, who I think is here, who is, I think, a fellow at NYU right
now, wrote a great piece that recently came out about having the pub-
lic—courtroom visitors, participants—being able to be more exposed
to what’s going on as sort of a check on judges.139 That’s part of the
answer, and part of what I’ve been thinking about is how you get the
public more involved and educated about what it is that judges are
actually doing, and not being able to sort of hide it behind a cloak.
Question from an Audience Member to the Panelists
Audience Member:
I wanted to follow up on White, and whether there have been any
studies relating to this as it applies to judges. I think there have been
some as it applies generally, but psychologically, once a person an-
nounces some type of position, even if they don’t commit to it, which
is sort of that line in White, have there been studies that say it’s more
difficult for the individual to change or be open-minded? Has any of
that been done in terms of judges who have announced something in a
campaign and then been confronted with a similar case and then
stayed “in the box,” as the commenter over there said? Has White
created a whole new set of biases that didn’t exist because now, once
you’ve announced, you’re on the record and you can’t then be more
open-minded? Are there any studies, anything you can speak to on
that?
Dmitry Bam:
Well, I don’t know if there were studies done with judges—I
mean, there’s lots of social science that looks at making previous com-
139. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014).
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mitments or being stuck to those views, so that has been done; but I
haven’t seen a study that’s been done with judges on that. But of
course, the majority in that case actually rejects that reasoning. The
majority says, “Look, we as judges, sometimes we’ve committed our-
selves in previous opinions, sometimes committed ourselves in books
that we’ve written as academics.” So Justice Scalia, in the majority,
says, “It doesn’t really matter. Just because we’ve announced our
views on something, that doesn’t mean we’re biased, even if it sort of
suggests that that’s what we believe.”140
Audience Member:
But is there a difference between doing that publicly on the cam-
paign trail versus in an opinion or in a law review article?
Dmitry Bam:
I would think so. And I think Justice Stevens or Ginsburg in dis-
sent says that there is a difference, and in fact, if you look at federal
nomination hearings, there’s a reason why we don’t say anything,
right? We don’t say anything useful because we’re worried about how
that would look, but now we’re letting judges do it in the course of
their campaigns.141 And what that really means, when you let them do
that, is you make them do it because they’re competing against others
who are doing it, or you’ve got questionnaires coming to judges and
they say “What are your views?” and you have to answer them, so I
think you’re right that there is a difference, but the Court rejects it.
Jed Shugerman:
I mean, this is part of the point in White. Both Kennedy and
O’Connor say that if a state chooses judicial elections, you’re going to
have people campaigning in those elections; that’s what you get with
elections.142 And so the downside is, people make these campaign
statements, and some would say about democracy that you actually
hope that people would actually have some stickiness to the things that
140. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 777 (2002) (“A judge’s
lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has never been
thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with good reason.”).
141. Id. at 806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Thus, the rationale underlying uncon-
strained speech in elections for political office—that representative government de-
pends on the public’s ability to choose agents who will act at its behest—does not
carry over to campaigns for the bench.”).
142. See id. at 789 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Moreover, contested elections gen-
erally entail campaigning.”).
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they say on the campaign trail that anchor them in. I think that’s wise;
I think if it’s uncomfortable for judges to be making promises or to be
making campaign statements or to be asking directly for money, there
is a plausible view that says, “That’s what comes with elections, so if
you don’t like it, then let’s see elections in full, and then the public
can either take them or reject them based upon what their benefits
are.”
Audience Member:
So are judicial elections unconstitutional?
Dmitry Bam:
Some have argued that.143
Jed Shugerman:
I think the point about federalism is to say that the public should
at least be able to see them in one way or the other and then make that
choice.
143. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Indepen-
dence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 498 (1986)
(observing that “the use of non-tenured state judges seems to be a clear violation of
procedural due process” in at least some cases).
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